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Introduction
Everyone is familiar with the way Main Street looks before an
election, plastered with the signs of hopeful candidates in bright colors
with catchy slogans. But someone new to California might wonder at
the numerous political signs which seem to be in code; "YES on 172-
it's for kids," or "NO on 81-Stop the Drilling." Of course, the exper-
ienced California voter just groans and wonders what the ballot initia-
tive issue of the moment may be. Initiatives are a common way of
enacting legislation in California and many other states.1 Initiatives
are pieces of proposed legislation placed on the ballot by collecting
the requisite number of signatures of registered voters, and which are
voted upon directly by citizens. The California initiative particularly
has long been known as the starting point for national political
trends.3 From Proposition 13, which started the nation-wide tax re-
volt by freezing property taxes in the 1970s, to Proposition 103,s
designed to control the skyrocketing costs of auto insurance in the
1980s, to Proposition 140,6 the enactment of term limits for state legis-
lators in 1990, national movements have begun at the California
polls.
7
The initiative process has always had critics among intellectuals
who think that allowing citizens to vote directly on legislation funda-
1. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
CALiFoRNA: A LEGACY LosT? 16-18 (1984).
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
3. James A. Barnes, Losing the Initiative, NAT'L J., Sept. 1, 1990, at 2046.
4. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 13, CALiFoRmA BALLOT PAWHLm. GEN-
ERAL ELECnON (1976).
5. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 103, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAwwPHzr.
GENERAL ELECnON 98-101, 140-44 (1988).
6. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 140, CALwoRmA BALLoT PAMNwmLE-r.
GENERAL ELECTION 68-71, 137-38 (1990).
7. Barnes, supra note 3, at 2047.
mentally undermines representative democracy." This criticism has
become more broad based in the last five to ten years, however, and
large numbers of California voters can now be numbered among the
critics of the initiative process.9 Unfortunately, there is good reason
for this increased criticism. Not only are initiatives becoming more
numerous, more complex, and more often the target of million dollar
campaigns,' 0 but these problems have increased geometrically due to
the introduction of a new political strategy, the counter-initiative."
Counter-initiatives are measures drafted by businesses, industry
groups, or occasionally by rival citizen groups in response to an initia-
tive already undergoing the ballot qualification process. 2 When
groups hear of a ballot initiative they dislike, they simply draft a mea-
sure they find more palatable and begin gathering signatures. A
counter-initiative may contain provisions that differ only slightly from
the original initiative, it may be composed of completely dissimilar
legislation on the same subject, and it may occasionally contain quite
deceptive reforms. 13 For example, in 1990, a group of environmental
organizations presented the Big Green Initiative, a three-part environ-
mental protection and regulation measure.' 4 Chemical manufacturers
circulated a counter-initiative which addressed only the pesticide pro-
visions and advertised it as a "pesticide safety measure."'" In the sev-
enties and eighties, citizen groups saw increased their use of the
initiative after discovery that it was an effective way to circumvent
legislatures unwilling or unable to pass controversial legislation.' 6 As
a response, in the 1980s, corporate interests that opposed many meas-
ures sponsored by citizen groups discovered the counter-initiative to
be a useful and affordable tool to undercut popular initiatives.' 7
In addition to severely burdening the initiative process, counter-
initiatives also place a huge burden on the judiciary. When two or
8. See generally Tim Schreiner, Angry Public Likely to Vote 'No' a Lot, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 6, 1990, at Al, A10 (quoting Preble Stolz).
9. Initiatives: The Monster That Threatens California Politics; Out of Contro, the
Process Itself Now Needs to be Reformed, L.A. TmEs, Nov. 12, 1990, at B4 [hereinafter
Initiatives] ("A recent Times Poll found that the public has its own strong reservations
about the initiative business.... [M]ore than seven in ten Californians think the initiative
process has 'gone out of control."').
10. CALIFORNA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FiN., DEMOCRACy By INmATrVE: SHAPING
CALiFomnnA's FOURTH BRANci4 OF GovEr=imar 10, 15 (1992).
11. Id. at 271.
12. Id. at 180-81.
13. Id. at 181 n.26.
14. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 128, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMHL.
GENERAL ELECTION 22-23, 74-84 (1990).
15. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 135, CALIFoRNIA BALLOT PAMPHLEr
GENERAL ELECtION 48-51, 121-23 (1990).
16. Id. at 59-63.
17. CALn OIA COMM'N ON CAMPAiN FIN., supra note 10, at 180-81.
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more initiatives with contrary provisions receive a majority of votes,
courts must decide which of the provisions of the various measures
will become law. Review of initiative measures places the judiciary in
a delicate position. Courts must walk a fine line between upholding
the will of the public and preventing unworkable laws, which cannot
later be significantly altered by the Legislature, from going into
effect.1
The review of counter-initiative measures first came before the
California Supreme Court in Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending
v. Fair Political Practices Commission.9 In Taxpayers, two 1988 cam-
paign-reform initiatives containing different proposals were passed by
the electorate.20  The court attempted to resolve the dilemma
presented by these opposing initiatives by holding that when two con-
flicting measures receive an electoral majority on the same ballot, only
the measure receiving the higher number of votes will take effect. The
approach adopted in Taxpayers is the method the courts currently em-
ploy. However, this approach does not produce satisfying results.
This Note addresses the Taxpayers approach to counter-initiatives
and alternatives. Part I of this Note sets out various problems with
the initiative process-the increase in the number and complexity of
initiatives, the professionalization of the initiative qualification pro-
cess, the immense amount of money spent on initiative campaigns-
and explores the role that the counter-initiative plays in exacerbating
these problems. Counter-initiatives increase the number of initiatives
on the ballot, increase the need for expensive advertising campaigns
to distinguish measures from one another, feed the signature-gather-
ing companies which exist simply to qualify ballot measures, and, most
importantly, complicate the issues to the point where it is almost im-
possible for a voter to cast an informed and well-considered vote.
Part II examines one particular counter-initiative situation, the
1988 campaign finance reform battle between Propositions 68 and 73.
These competing initiatives were separately qualified for the ballot
and both were passed. It then fell to the courts to review the two
initiatives and determine if and how either would become law.
Part III analyzes the way in which initiative measures are gener-
ally reviewed in California, while Part IV explores the method of judi-
cial review applied specifically to counter-initiative measures in the
context of Propositions 68 and 73. Part IV also analyzes the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Taxpayers, which established that
18. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. 1503,1506-
07 (1989).
19. 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
20. Richard C. Paddock & Douglas Shuit, 2 Measures on Campaign Funding Lead,
L.A. Tmpns, June 8, 1988, at Al.
under section 10(b) of the California Constitution, when two compet-
ing initiatives are passed by the voters, only the initiative receiving the
greater number of votes may take effect. Part, IV finally critiques the
court's rationale for the decision and the court's unwillingness to com-
bine various provisions of two counter-initiative measures into one
law.
Part V examines judicial review of counter-initiatives after Tax-
payers. The Taxpayers decision has created confusion regarding judi-
cial review of counter-initiatives and has been avoided by later courts.
Part VI proposes that, in order for the initiative process to remain
a viable political tool in California, a clear standard of judicial review
needs to be set forth, preferably one leading the courts to engage in
close scrutiny of the intent of the drafters of counter-initiatives. Some
relatively simple legislative reforms would also help greatly in alleviat-
ing the problems caused by counter-initiatives. The California judici-
ary, however, needs to apply a more rigorous level of scrutiny to
counter-initiative measures regardless of legislative changes.
The flaws in the initiative process leave it open to abuse by domi-
nant and powerful groups. 21 The court must recognize the potential
for the exploitation of the initiative process by groups who seek only
to cancel a competing measure. It should analyze the intent of the
measures' drafters, particularly when these measures have been quali-
fied solely as a response to another initiative. The California initiative
faces long-term problems, and if it is to retain its function as a valua-
ble electoral tool, the judiciary must take a more active role in guard-
ing the initiative process.
I. Problems with the Initiative Process in California
A. The History and Significance of the Initiative
Most Californians seem to regard voting by initiative as a sacro-
sanct right, slightly below life and liberty.22 This depth of attachment
is surprising considering that the initiative has only existed in Califor-
nia for eighty-two years.23 Initiative, referendum, and recall proce-
dures came to California as part of a package of twenty-three
21. See Eule, supra note 18, at 1555-56.
22. See A.D. Ertukel, Debating Initiative Reform: A Summary of the Second Annual
Symposium on Elections at The Center for the Study of Law and Politics, 2 J.L. & POL. 313,
331-34 (1985). A 1982 California Poll by the Field Institute found that eighty percent of
people polled regard statewide propositions as good for California while only six percent
saw them as bad. "Direct democracy is a sacred part of politics and governance in Califor-
nia, and despite the problems cited ... anything other than technical changes will be bit-
terly resisted." Id at 331.
23. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VoTms OF CALiFoRmNA, supra note 1, at 23 (1984).
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measures presented to the voters in a 1911 special election 24 Taken
together, the first initiative measures constituted a broad sweep at re-
form by the newly elected progressive government 25 Subjects ranged
from women's suffrage to regulation of railroads and utilities to im-
proved oversight of judicial elections.
2 6
The initiative27 gives Californians a direct voice in lawmaking and
provides an outlet for voter outrage.-8 It also educates and mobilizes
the public on specific issues,29 and allows citizen groups to circumvent
special-interest dominated legislatures.30 The initiative also .acts as a
political bargaining tool. A citizen group's threat to utilize the initia-
tive may be enough of a bargaining chip to either bring about legisla-
tive compromise or force the legislature to deal with issues it had
previously been unwilling to tackle.31 In California, the initiative has
spurred legislative action in such areas as nuclear safety,32 agricul-
tural-worker safety,33 and forest protection.3 4 When the state legisla-
ture is unwilling or unable to deal with issues, the initiative process
"'extend[s] the range of voices we hear in a democracy,"' giving a
forum to groups and individuals whose views are often not heard in
mainstream democratic legislative systems.35
24. CALIFORNIA COMMs'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 41. The right to inde-
pendently adopt or reject legislation by popular vote, not subject to a gubernatorial veto,
was itself incorporated into the state constitution by vote of the people. It. at 42.
25. See JOHN H. CULVER & JOHN C. SYER, PowER AN PoLrIcs IN CALIFORNIA 30-
31 (1980).
26. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAwAxoN FIN., supra note 10, at 41.
27. Unless otherwise specified, "initiative" includes initiatives, referendums, elections
and recalls.
28. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 71.
29. See Ertukel, supra note 21, at 332; see also Steven De Salvo, Celebrities Stump for
Clean Water, UPI, Sept. 28, 1986. In the 1986 election, supporters of Proposition 65, the
anti-toxics initiative, organized a "Clean Water Caravan" bus tour which traversed the
state relying on celebrities to attract voters. Id. The tour received a great deal of local
media coverage, and became a precursor to the bus tours of the 1992 presidential cam-
paign, which are partially credited for solidifying the lead Bill Clinton held in the wake of
the Democratic Convention. See Timothy Clifford, Clinton's Road to the White House,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1992, at 24.
30. CALIFORNIA COvnVs'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 71.
31. CULVER & SYER, supra note 25, at 75.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Elliot Diringer, Timber Bills Spawn New Hostilities, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 27,1992,
at A17. H. A. Arbit, the main backer of the failed Proposition 130 forest protection mea-
sure, decided not to submit the signatures gathered for requalification of the initiative in
return for passage and signature of a group of less stringent timber protection bills dubbed
the "Grand Accord." Id at A18.
35. Ertukel, supra note 22, at 332.
The initiative also gives voters a sense of power by enabling them
to circumvent the government and politicians.36 As one commentator
expressed it: "'I have a real love affair with the initiative process. I
think most Californians do. I think maybe the initiative process is
providing a nice catharsis for people in terms of feeling like they are a
real part of the process."' 37 Popular frustration with government in
the 1990s is at record levels,38 echoing the populist outrage which
brought the initiative into being. Voters nationwide have acted on
their frustration by implementing term limits3 9 and supporting candi-
dates perceived to be political outsiders.4° While California voters are
beginning to perceive the initiative process as out of control,41 the ini-
tiative power remains a valued weapon in expressing their frustration
against entrenched politicians.42
B. Problems With the Initiative Process
Despite voters' appreciation of direct democracy and the unique
checks it places on special interests, many commentators today claim
that when the Progressives created the initiative power, they un-
leashed a monster.43 Critics argue that the initiative power, originally
conceived of as a way to give citizens a direct hand in government, has
become a self-supporting industry and a tool for special interests.44
36. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 71.
37. Ertukel, supra note 22, at 334 (quoting George Young).
38. See Kevin Phillips, For an Angry Electorate, Perot Emerges as Answer, L.A. TImrs,
May 31, 1992, at Ml.
39. Jenifer Warren, State Joins Near Sweep for the Term Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 4,
1992 at Al, A26 ("[L]ook[s] to be a 14 state sweep ... on term limits.").
40. Patt Morrison, Women Assess the Spoils of Victory, L.A. TMEs, Nov. 6, 1992 at
A3, A39 ("Among the elements that made women more electable this year [was] ... a
preference for 'outsiders'."). The main expression of this frustration has been the passage
of both state and federal term limits by initiative, not only in California but in fourteen
other states. Id. Paul Feldman, In the Senate, It's Also the Year of the Democrat, L.A.
TnMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at A3 (noting that 31 percent of voters voting for both Boxer and
Feinstein cited the need to bring change to Washington as a major influence in their
decision).
41. Initiatives, supra note 9 ("A recent Tunes Poll found that the public has its own
strong reservations about the initiative business.... [M]ore than seven in ten Californians
think the initiative process has 'gone out of control."').
42. CALFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 71; Ertukel, supra note
22, at 334. See also Cathleen Decker & Paul Jacobs, California Elections: Mix of Fear,
Frustration Bring Strong Voter Discontent, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at A3, A43 ("In a
September survey by the Tunes, voters blamed the Legislature for 'failing to do its job'
and, in effect, forcing issues to be dealt with by initiative. Against that backdrop, voter
approval of Proposition 140, the term limits initiative, seemed predictable.").
43. Eugene C. Lee, Hiram Johnson's Great Reform is an Idea Whose Time has Passed,
31 PuB. AFF. RuP. No. 4, at 1 (1990) ("[IThe initiative, instead of serving as a safety valve,
has become an uncontrolled political force of its own.").
44. See generally Ertukel, supra note 22, at 313.
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Criticism of the initiative process focuses on four areas. First, the
rapidly increasing number of measures on each ballot is a cause for
concern. 4 Second, the recent trend toward multiple and complex ini-
tiatives is making it more difficult for voters to make intelligent deci-
sions.46 Third, the rise of an "initiative industry," consulting
companies whose sole business is qualifying measures for the ballot,
has made it almost impossible to qualify an initiative without the
assistance of a professional political group.47 Finally, the lack of cam-
paign spending limits and the one-sided spending in many initiative
campaigns distorts the voters' understanding of various measures. 8
1. Initiatives, Initiatives Everywhere
A comparison of the phone book sized ballot pamphlets of recent
years with the more moderate epistles of ten or twenty years ago indi-
cates how rapidly the amount of initiatives has increased. 49 From 1911
until World War II, thirty to thirty-five initiatives qualified for the Cal-
ifornia ballot each decade.50 Between 1960 and 1969 only nine meas-
ures qualified.5 In contrast, the 1992 California general election
ballot alone contained thirteen measures.52 If the number of initia-
tives qualifying for the ballot continues to grow at the pace of the last
twenty years, seventy-five to one hundred initiative measures could
easily qualify during the 1990s. 53 It is easy to see the obstacles that
voters face in attempting to educate themselves about issues which
range from the profound to the obscure in each election cycle.5" Yet
this increase in the number of initiatives is only one factor contribut-
ing to the initiative morass.
45. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 10.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 12-13.
48. See CALIFORNIA COM' ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 14.
49. Eule, supra note 18, at 1508 (relating how, upon moving to California, Professor
Eule mistook his ballot pamphlet for the phone book.).
50. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 54.
51. Id.
52. See California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election 4-6 (1992).
53. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 55 table 2.1.
54. Schreiner, supra note 8 ("The 224 page [1990] voter ballot pamphlet is two
volumes thick and almost requires a master's degree to comprehend."). Initiative provi-
sions range from the vast fiscal impact of Proposition 13's tax reform to obscure matters
such as whether property tax exemptions should be extended to spouses of persons killed
in combat. See Argument and Text of Proposition 13, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMwHLEr.
GENERAL ELECTION 28-31 (1976); Argument and Text of Proposition 160, CALIORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET. GENERAL ELECTION 28-31, 68 (1992).
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2. The Increased Complexity of Initiative Measures
A more significant problem than the actual number of initiatives
is the complexity of issues they now address. Detailed statutory re-
forms on subjects as varied as auto insurance, property tax, and crimi-
nal justice have been enacted by initiative in the last fifteen years.55
Other complex measures on environmental protection and campaign
financing have been qualified for the ballot but defeated by the
electorate.56
The increased complexity of initiative measures is primarily the
result of the state legislature's inability to pass comprehensive legisla-
tion on many subjects.57 For nineteen of the past twenty-five years,
the legislative and executive branches in California have been con-
trolled by opposing political parties, making it virtually impossible to
accomplish significant goals through the legislative process.58 Various
groups have turned to the initiative as a logical alternative to legisla-
tive action on a broad range of issues.5 9 Many successful initiatives in
the last fifteen years contained proposals first attempted in the legisla-
ture.6" The property tax revolt of Proposition 13 and the auto insur-
ance rate reductions of Proposition 103 were both qualified for the
ballot after less drastic legislation had repeatedly failed to pass in the
legislature.61
One cause of both the increased numbers and increased complex-
ity of initiatives is politicians' use of initiatives to enact pet legisla-
tion.62 Governor Pete Wilson has repeatedly used this approach,
successfully repealing many state constitutional protections for crimi-
nal defendants with the 1990 Victims' Bill of Rights,63 and unsuccess-
fully attempting to alter the state welfare system significantly with
55. CAIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 58 Table 2A.
56. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 128, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAHLEr-.
GENERAL ELEcrIoN 22-23, 74-84 (1990); Arguments and Text of Propositions 68 and 73,
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAM.HLEr: PRIMARY ELECION 12-15, 34-35, 52-56, 63 (1988).
57. CALEFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMIAGN FIN., supra note 10, at 59-61.
58. Id.
59. Bill Bradley, Initiatives Become a Political Tool-and a Big Business, CAL. Bus.,
Feb. 1990, at 19. As political consultant David Townsend noted, "[i]t's now the main way
to get big things done here." ld.
60. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAwMAiGN FIN., supra note 10, at 59-61.
61. Id. at 59, 61.
62. See Joel Fox & Harvey Rosenfield, The People's Initiatives are Under Heavy As-
sault, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at B7 ("Legislators love the initiative process when it
serves their own purposes. Of the 28 measures on the ballot last November, 22 were spon-
sored by legislators or elected officials.").
63. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 115, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLE. PRI-
MARY ELECrION, 32-35, 65-69 (1990); CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra
note 10, at 63 Table 2.6.
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Proposition 165 in 1992.64 Former California Attorney General John
Van de Kamp used three initiatives as a political platform in his unsuc-
cessful bid for Governor in 1990.65 Also in the 1990 election, Assem-
blymen Lloyd Connolly sponsored an alcohol tax measure that he had
repeatedly attempted to get through the legislature, and Lieutenant
Governor Leo McCarthy sponsored a sales tax increase to fund drug
treatment programs.65 One veteran consultant has observed that
"'[i]nitiatives are becoming the candidates' issue papers."67 The fail-
ure of the state legislature to enact certain legislation has led politi-
cians to resort to the initiative process themselves.
3. The Initiative Industry
The growing number of initiatives qualifying for the ballot each
year has resulted in part from the growth in size and sophistication of
companies which specialize in initiative qualification. These compa-
nies pay employees to gather the requisite number of signatures of
registered voters within the allotted time.68 While voter attitudes to-
ward a given initiative will affect the ease with which signatures may
be gathered, money and professional signature-gathering services are
a virtual necessity to ensure a measure will qualify for the ballot.69
Nearly a decade has passed since volunteer efforts alone gathered suf-
ficient signatures to qualify an initiative.
70
The experience of the qualification of a recent forest protection
measure illustrates this new dependence on professional signature-
gathering services. Proposition 130,71 known as 'Forests Forever,' was
64. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 165, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMP-LET.
GENERAL ELECTION, 46-49, 72-79 (1992).
65. CALIFORmA COMW'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 62. The measures in-
cluded Proposition 128-the Big Green initiative-co-sponsored with various environmen-
tal groups, Proposition 131, dealing with term limits and campaign finance reform, and
Proposition 129, which closed a budgetary loophole in order to obtain funding for in-
creased drug enforcement.
66. See Arguments and Text of Propositions 133 and 134, California Ballot Pamphlet:
General Election 40-47, 117-21 (1990); CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra
note 10, at 63 Table 2.6.
67. Bradley, supra note 59, at 19 (quoting Los Angeles media consultant Sidney
Galanty).
68. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIn., supra note 10, at 126 (requisite number
must be gathered in 150 days); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b) (initiative measure qualifies by
presenting signatures of registered voters equalling five percent of the number of regis-
tered voters at the time of the most recent gubernatorial election for a statute and eight
percent for a constitutional amendment).
69. CALIFORNIA COMM'W ON CAMPAIGN FIn., supra note 10, at 157.
70. Id. at 145.
71. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 130, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMP-LEr.
GENERAL ELECTION 28-29, 94-101 (1990).
circulated in the spring of 1990.72 During this period, media attention
was focused on environmental issues,73 culminating in the twentieth
anniversary of Earth Day and best-seller status for environmental
manuals such as 50 Simple Things You Can Do To Save the Earth.74
The measure addressed only forest preservation and was quite
straightforwardV5 The appeal of the issue should have enabled sup-
porters to mobilize hundreds of volunteers, but even with these fac-
tors operating in its favor, supporters spent $828,730 on signature
gatherers to ensure qualification.76
While the popular appeal of an initiative remains a factor in the
cost of qualification, "[b]allot qualification can reasonably be assured
at $500,000 and guaranteed at a price tag of $1 million or more.
77
Political professionals have so thoroughly insinuated themselves into
the initiative process that not only is their participation essential to
qualify an initiative measure, but they can assure qualification of any
measure for the right price.7'
4. Initiative Campaign Spending
A problem closely related to the need for paid signature gather-
ers is the absence of limits on campaign contributions in initiative
campaigns. Unlike campaigns for political office where contribution
limits have become fairly common,79 contributions to initiative cam-
paigns are unlimited in every state.
80
In First National Bank v. Belotti,8s the United States Supreme
Court held that "[t]he risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections... simply is not present in a popular vote on a
72. Carl Nolte, 'Forests Forever' Initiative on Ballot, S.F. CHRoN., June 15, 1990, at B7.
73. Kevin Brass, Planet Heats Up as Media Issue, L.A. TiMEs, Mar. 20, 1990, at Fl.
74. JoHN JAVNA & JULm BENNETr, 50 SIPLE TmNGS You CAN DO TO SAVE THE
EARTH (1990); Tun Ward, UPI, July 30, 1990 (noting bestseller status).
75. See Arguments and Text of Proposition 130, supra note 71.
76. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 152 Table 4.3. Propo-
sition 128, the Big Green Initiative, probably came as close as possible to an all volunteer
qualification effort. Only $24,651 was spent on paid circulators. Id. Even those circulators
were grassroots activists working to qualify all three measures sponsored by gubernatorial
candidate Van de Kamp. However, Big Green was uniquely lucky in its timing and the
speed with which volunteers were able to be organized by the sponsoring environmental
groups. Telephone Interview with Duane Peterson, Press Secretary, Yes on 128-Big
Green (Nov. 10, 1993).
77. CALnORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPwAGN FIN., supra note 10, at 160.
78. Id.
79. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Elections Campaign
Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)-(g) (1992) (FECA imposes contribution limits on all federal
elections).
80. CALnORNiA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 291.
81. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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public issue."8 Although the Court has allowed restrictions on contri-
butions to candidate campaigns on the ground that they maintain the
integrity of individual politicians, the Court has been unwilling to im-
pose contribution restrictions on initiatives, finding no corresponding
risk of corruption.83
The lack of spending limits in initiative campaigns does have an
impact on election results and, contrary to the Court's finding in
Belotti, arguably does harm the integrity of the initiative electoral pro-
cess.84 Fundraising in initiative campaigns is often extremely unbal-
anced.85 While an industry campaign may have a multi-million dollar
budget, a citizen group may be struggling to pay a press spokesper-
son's salary8 6 In the eighteen highest spending initiative campaigns
since 1956, 83% of all contributions have come from business inter-
estsY. Large contributions by corporate donors are particularly effec-
tive when spent opposing an initiative.88 Large contributions allow
anti-initiative 'NO' campaigns to launch television advertising blitzes
that exaggerate the effects of the proposed measures.89 This tactic not
only places supporters of an initiative on the defensive, but also allows
dubious charges to go unanswered because supporters cannot afford
the advertising necessary to rebut such exaggerations.9° Advertising
may have an even greater influence on voters in an initiative campaign
than in a race for political office because the voters have nothing but
the ballot pamphlet and advertisements upon which to base their deci-
sion.91 While advertising does play a pivotal role in swaying public
opinion in the election of public officials, at least in a candidate elec-
82. Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 788 n.26.
84. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 288 (discussing BErrY
Zisi, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASSROOTS: STATE BALLOT IssuEs Am THm ELncro-
RAL PRocEss (1987)) (noting that spending has been found to be the single biggest predic-
tor of initiative electoral success).
85. Id. at 273. The campaign against Proposition 128 received $947,000 from Atlantic
Richfield, $812,000 from Chevron and $600,000 from Shell, as well as between $100,000
and $500,000 from 26 chemical companies, including Dow and Monsanto. Much of this
money was donated in the closing days of the campaign with little time for voters to react
to financial disclosure statements. Telephone Interview with Duane Peterson, supra note
76.
86. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at Appendix F: Data
Analysis Project 390-427.
87. Id. at 270.
88. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Expe-
rience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. Rnv. 505, 545 (1982).
89. Id at 533-42.
90. Id. It costs between three and five hundred thousand dollars to purchase televi-
sion advertising in the Los Angeles media-market depending on how much time is
purchased. Telephone Interview with Duane Peterson, supra note 76.
91. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 198-99.
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tion, voters have other sources of information to turn to in making
their decisions. The guidance of political parties,92 the past record of a
candidate, or simply the candidate's personality are all absent as deci-
sion making factors in initiative campaigns.93 Unbalanced spending
distorts issues and makes it virtually impossible for even an astute
voter to make knowledgeable decisions on complex initiatives.
C. The Development of the Counter-Initiative Strategy
The problems facing the initiative process have been magnified
by the development of a particular political strategy: placing two con-
flicting initiatives, or counter-initiatives, on the ballot simultaneously.
While the subject matter of initiatives have always had some overlap,
in the mid-1980s, groups started strategically qualifying measures that
explicitly contradicted another measure.94 Counter-initiatives first
gained extensive public attention in the 1988 auto insurance initiative
free-for-all, when four competing measures were on the same ballot.95
While the one-half to one million dollar price tag for drafting and
qualifying an initiative measure may be daunting to citizen groups and
grassroots organizations,96 for corporations or industry groups op-
posed to an initiative measure, the cost of qualifying a counter-initia-
tive is a bargain compared to spending ten to twenty million dollars in
contributions for advertising to defeat an initiative.97
In the 1990 general election, chemical and pesticide industries
strongly opposed the passage of the comprehensive environmental
regulation measure "Big Green"9" because of its ban on many com-
monly used pesticides.99 These industries were wary of Big Green's
popular appeal, and were uncertain what would be required to defeat
the measure. 1°° A memorandum from the Western Agricultural and
Chemical Association prepared in relation to Big Green explicitly laid
out this thinking. The memorandum stated, "[i]t will be extremely dif-
92. Political parties often split on whether to endorse ballot initiatives. Telephone in-
terview with Duane Peterson, supra note 76.
93. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 198.
94. Id. at 180-81.
95. Id. at 271 n.15 (noting that the auto insurance measures were Propositions 100,
101, 103 and 104, out of which only Proposition 103, sponsored by Ralph Nader, passed).
96. Id at 160.
97. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 266 Table 8.2, 270-71.
Five measures in the 1990 general election had total contributions of over 10 million dol-
lars. Id.
98. See Argument and Text of Proposition 128, supra note 14.
99. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 273-74.
100. Harold Meyerson, The Year of the Initiative, L.A. WKLY., May 11-17, 1990.
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ficult to defeat with a 'NO' campaign only. We can win with an alter-
nate initiative."' 1
Because of its strategic value, the use of the counter-initiative is
becoming more common. For example, the 1990 general election bal-
lot contained thirteen initiatives, eight of which were counter-initia-
tives on four subjects: pesticide regulation, term limits, alcohol tax,
and forest preservation.' °2 Four of the eight counter-initiatives were
industry-sponsored measures, which were drafted in response to the
corresponding citizen measures and would not otherwise have been
on the ballot. 0 3 Not surprisingly, it was in the midst of the 1990 pre-
election campaign, that a poll indicated for the first time that most
voters felt the initiative process was "out of control.""°
The counter-initiative serves a number of purposes. Most obvi-
ously, passage of a competing initiative will result in laws the sponsors
find more reasonable or favorable to their cause.'0 5 This was certainly
the thinking behind the 1988 measures on both auto insurance and
campaign financing.'06 The presence of an alternative measure on the
ballot also provides its sponsors with an effective tool in defeating
measures they oppose.' °7 In their advertising, sponsors can present a
counter-measure as a more "reasonable" or "less extreme alternative"
for voters to choose. 10 8 A counter-initiative offered as an alternative
helps create a 'NO' vote, since its presence pushes voter opinion on
the target initiative from initial support to uncertainty and then oppo-
sition late in the campaign. 10 9 As one study notes, "[in candidate
elections, an uncertain voter often opts for the status quo by voting for
the incumbent; in initiative elections, the uncertain, hesitant or con-
fused voter typically votes 'no."' ° In the advertising campaign
against Big Green, opponents of the initiative capitalized on electoral
101. Id. (quoting an internal memorandum of the Western Agricultural Chemical
Association).
102. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPwHL GENERAL ELECrION (1990) (The measures
were: 128 and 135, "Big Green" v. "Big Brown" on pesticides; 130 and 135, "Forests For-
ever" v. "Big Stump" on forest preservation; 134 and 126, "Nickel a Drink" v. "Half-cent a
Drink" on alcohol tax; 131 and 140, "Drain the swamp" v. "Nuke the swamp" on term
limits.).
103. CALIFORNIA COvM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 271-74.
104. Initiatives, supra note 9, at B4.
105. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 271-74.
106. Id. at 271, n.15.
107. Id. at 181 n.26.
108. Id.; Telephone interview with Duane Peterson, supra note 76.
109. David Magleby, Opinion Formation and Opinion Change in Ballot Proposition
Campaigns, in MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION 105 (Michael Margolis & Gary Mauser
eds., 1989).
110.' CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 200.
COUNTER-INITIATIVE QUAGMIRE
confusion by closing all advertisements with a statement by a reluctant
narrator to the effect that "it just tries to do to much.""1
When counter-initiatives conflict only on some points, or do not
address all the issues contained in the target citizen-sponsored mea-
sure, it increases voter frustration and confusion. One survey con-
ducted after the 1990 election found that 84% of the people polled
believed that "'there are so many initiatives on the ballot with com-
plex issues that the average voter cannot make an intelligent
choice."" 1 2 Sponsors of counter-initiatives are able to qualify simpler
and more straightforward measures because, unlike citizen groups,
they are usually not interested in imposing comprehensive regula-
tions." 3 One problem all initiatives face is the tendency of voters to
vote 'NO' on complex or confusing issues." 4 One study found that of
fourteen "low-clarity" initiatives in California, all of which encoun-
tered high spending opposition campaigns, thirteen were defeated."1
5
In a broad-ranging initiative measure, everyone can find something to
dislike." '6 It may be easier for voters to oppose complicated reforms
that they support in principle, such as forest protection or campaign
reform, when there is a simplistic counter-initiative alternative
available." 7
The final, perhaps unintended effect of a counter-initiative arises
after the electorate has voted. On occasion, both the target and the
counter-initiative pass."' When both conflicting initiatives secure a
majority of affirmative votes, someone must determine which provi-
sions will take effect. The responsibility for sorting out the quagmire
of initiative and counter-initiative falls entirely upon the California
courts. Unfortunately, this responsibility creates special difficulties
for the courts, which were exemplified by the campaign reform initia-
tive decisions.
H. The Campaign Reform Initiative Battle
In 1990, the California Supreme Court attempted to resolve some
of the problems created by counter-initiatives in the wake of an elec-
111. Telephone interview with Duane Peterson, supra note 76.
112. Initiatives, supra note 9, at B4 (quoting L.A. Tsnvs Poll).
113. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 181 n.26; Schreiner,
supra note 8, at A10 ("These fat cats ... don't care whether the measures pass because
they're for the status quo.") (quoting grassroots activist Harvey Rosenfield).
114. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FN., supra note 10, at 87-89.
115. BETTY H. ZISK, MoNEY, MEDIA AND Tm GRASSROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES
AND TE ELEcroRAL PROCESS 168-69 (1987).
116. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FN., supra note 10, at 199-200.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 181 n.26.
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toral battle between two campaign financing reform measures.119 Pro-
positions 68120 and 73121 both sought to reform the campaign spending
process within the state. Proposition 68 was drafted in response to a
report by state leaders on campaign finance reform. It was modeled
in part on a proposal contained in that report." Designed to reduce
the influence of special interests outside the legislature and the legisla-
tive leadership, Proposition 68 limited not only contributions to indi-
vidual candidates and total contributions by one individual or group
to all candidates, it also prevented the political party leadership from
transferring contributions from safe incumbents to needy cam-
paigns."z Proposition 68 also limited campaign spending, and pro-
vided public funding for candidates who agreed to abide by the
spending limitations.124 The coalition backing the drafting and qualifi-
cation of the Proposition included Common Cause, the League of Wo-
men Voters, and various consumer, environmental, and senior citizen
groups.1
5
The counter-initiative, Proposition 73, was drafted by incumbent
legislators including Assemblyman Ross Johnson and State Senators
Quentin Kopp and Joseph Montoya. 26 Although Proposition 73 im-
posed some contribution limits, its main provisions expressly prohib-
ited public financing of campaigns, which directly conflicted with
Proposition 68.127 Both measures were opposed by Governor
Deukmejian and democratic legislative leaders including Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown and Senate Leader David Roberti.
12
Supporters of Proposition 68 raised approximately $800,000 for
both qualification and advertising, an amount considered sufficient for
a measure with high public appeal appearing on a primary election
119. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799
P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
120. Text of Proposition 68, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHL=.ET PRIMARY ELECTIoN 13,
52-56 (1988).
121. Text of Proposition 73, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLEr. PRIMARY ELECrION 33,
63 (1988).
122. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., THE NEW GOLD RUsH: FINANcING
CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGNS (1985).
123. See Analysis by the Legislative Analyst of Proposition 68, CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAirzr: PRIMARY ELEcmON 12-13 (1988).
124. Arguments and Text of Proposition 68, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLErT PRIMARY
ELECrION 13, 54-55 (1988).
125. Richard C. Paddock, California Elections; Both Sides Seek Funds to Carry Message
on Campaign Financing, L.A. Tmnds, May 25, 1988, at A3.
126. 1i Montoya later resigned under indictment for racketeering. See Chronology of
FBI Sting Investigation, UPI, Sept. 17, 1990.
127. Argument in Favor of Proposition 73, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLr PRIMARY
ELECTION 34 (1988).
128. Paddock, supra note 125, at 20.
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ballot.129 The backers of Proposition 73, on the other hand, did not
set up a campaign office or purchase advertising, and did not expect to
raise more than $100,000.131 Opponents of both initiatives launched a
last minute television campaign which focused on the public financing
provisions of Proposition 68, insinuating that members of the Ku Klux
Klan would be eligible to receive taxpayer dollars. 3' While the oppo-
sition campaign reduced the popularity of both measures,'132 since the
negative advertising focused mainly on Proposition 68, its popularity
declined more significantly. 133 Proposition 68 passed with an approval
level of 53% while Proposition 73 coasted to victory at 58%.13' As a
Proposition 68 campaign spokesman explained: "'There was no cam-
paign for the other one. It slid through on the backs of our effort."1 3 5
The passage of Proposition 73 accomplished three goals. It lim-
ited the amount of money individuals and committees could contrib-
ute to a candidate, it prohibited a donor from exceeding those limits
within a fiscal year, and it banned all public financing of campaigns.
36
Proposition 68 contained additional provisions that its supporters
sought to implement. 37 These included a ban on fundraising during
the years when a candidate's name was not on the ballot, limits on
total contributions by an individual or committee to all legislative can-
didates, limits on the total amount any individual politician could ac-
cept in a given election, and increased penalties for violation of these
rules.' 38 Proposition 68 applied only to campaigns by candidates for
the state legislature, while Proposition 73 applied to campaigns for all
elected offices in the state, including local municipal posts.'
39
After the election, sponsors of Proposition 68 appealed to the
Fair Political Practices Commission seeking to enforce the provisions
of Proposition 68 which were either not addressed by or not in conflict
129. Telephone interview with Fredric Woocher, Press Spokesperson for Proposition 68
(Mar. 1, 1993).
130. Paddock, supra note 125.
131. Paddock & Shuit, supra note 20.
132. Telephone interview with Fredric Woocher, supra note 129.
133. Id.
134. Brief of Respondent Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending at 2 n.3, Taxpayers to
Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990)
(No. S-012016).
135. Paddock & Shuit, supra note 20, at 24 (quoting Fredric Woocher).
136. See Text of Proposition 73, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET. PRIMARY ELECrION
33, 63 (1988).
137. See Analysis by the Legislative Analyst for Propositions 68 and 73, CALIFoRNiA
BALLOT PAm . PRIMARY ELECrION 12-13, 32-33 (1988).
138. See Text of Proposition 68, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PNwHLn.. PRIMARY ELECrION
13, 54-55 (1988).
139. See Text of Proposition 73, CALnoRNIA BALLOT PAMPHLE. PRIMARY ELECION
33, 63 (1988). For a summary of the provisions of the two measures, see Brief of Respon-
dent at 1-2, Taxpayers, supra note 134.
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with those of Proposition 73.140 In the first judicial decision address-
ing the two initiatives, the California Court of Appeal, in Center for
Public Interest Law v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 4' found
that Proposition 68's expenditure limits and public financing provi-
sions, which complied with constitutional requirements regarding
spending limitations 42 and were modeled on the federal campaign
laws, 43 were in direct conflict with Proposition 73's express ban on
public financing. Hence they could not go into effect.144 The remain-
ing dispute focused on whether the additional contribution limits and
enhanced penalties of Proposition 68 could take effect. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court addressed this dispute in Taxpayers to Limit Cam-
paign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Commission.45
i. Judicial Review of Direct Democracy
Before exploring how the California Supreme Court dealt with
Propositions 68 and 73 in Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v.
Fair Political Practices Commission it is helpful to analyze how the
California courts have reviewed initiatives. The problems of the initi-
ative process-the growth in number and complexity of measures, the
sophisticated campaigns, and particularly the increasing use of
counter-initiatives-are forcing the judiciary to evaluate and to invali-
date more initiative measures than ever before.146 The question that
the courts in California now face is how closely they should scrutinize
initiative measures passed by a majority of the electorate.
Because an initiative becomes law as soon as it is passed by the
electorate and does not go through the legislative negotiation process,
the judiciary is left with the burden of determining how to implement
the sometimes muddled measure without the aid of legislative history.
Serving as the only check on the constitutionality of an initiative also
places the courts in an awkward position. The lack of legislative
checks and balances in the initiative process forces the courts into the
role of "'the policemen of the process not only with challenges about
petition circulation and other campaign practices, but in the end de-
termining constitutionality." 4 7 Although the United States Supreme
Court has been unwilling to recognize a different standard for analyz-
140. In re Bell, 11 Op. Fair Political Practices Comm'n 1 (1988).
141. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1476 (1989), petition for review denied (Aug. 17, 1989).
142. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
143. Federal Elections Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1993).
144. Center for Pub. Interest Law, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1476, 1485 (1989).
145. 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
146. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAiGN FIN., supra note 10, at 303.
147. Ertukel, supra note 22, at 330 (quoting David Magleby).
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ing initiative measures, 148 the California Supreme Court seems more
attuned to the fact that, as one commentator states, "[a] judicial deci-
sion striking down a voter effort... risks engendering a perception by
the public itself that its will has been subverted.11 49 While it is diffi-
cult for the public to become informed about the substance of an initi-
ative, they are much more aware of the issues on which they have
voted than they are of new statutes enacted into law by the legisla-
ture.1 50 If a measure has garnered enough popular support to pass, a
significant portion of the public is aware of the issue. The media is
also more likely to cover judicial action on such popular initiative
measures. 151 Invalidation by the court can result in public outrage, 52
and because the judiciary has no direct enforcement power, it is ques-
tionable whether it should use its scarce political capital to invalidate
popularly passed initiatives.
A. Competing Theories of Judicial Review of Initiative Measures
There are two competing theories regarding the degree of defer-
ence courts should give initiatives. One theory advocates close scru-
tiny of citizen measures, giving initiatives a "hard judicial look." The
other theory argues that initiatives should be treated with great
deference. 53
The "hard look" theory is premised on the idea that because di-
rect democracy was not addressed in the United States Constitution,
the outcome of initiative votes should not receive a great deal of def-
erence, 54 and that initiatives should not be subject to the same defer-
ential rules of construction as statutes passed by a legislature.155
Advocates of this theory, particularly Professor Julian Eule, argue that
the presumption extended to acts of the legislature, that enactments
are constitutional so long as they have a rational basis, should not ap-
ply to the less deliberative initiative process.' 6 The judiciary's tradi-
148. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
295 (1981) ("It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [this law],
because the voters may no more violate the Constitution ... than a legislative body.").
149. Eule, supra note 18, at 1506-07. Former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Grodin acknowledges this phenomenon: "'It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature
that a statute it has adopted is unconstitutional, to tell that to the people of a state who
have indicated their direct support for the measure through the ballot is another."' Id. at
1507 n.12 (quoting JOSEPH P. GRODIN, IN Pvnsurr OF JUSTICE 105 (1989)).
150. Id at 1579.
151. See Bill Sing, What Does Prop. 103 Approval Mean? Here Are Some Answers,
L.A. TIMEs, May 5, 1989, at A28 col.1.
152. John Balzar, Initiatives, 7ime for Reform?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at Al.
153. Eule, supra note 18, at 1549.
154. Id. at 1558-62.
155. Id at 1568, 1571-73.
156. Id.
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tional caution in modifying or invalidating laws is premised on a
balance of powers, a concern that is absent in the initiative context. 5 7
Because initiatives originate and are passed outside the legislature,
"hard look" advocates argue that the courts need not be concerned
with the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of
government or with the balance of power between the federal govern-
ment and the states. 58 Professor Eule contends that the absence of
traditional checks and balances in the initiative process, such as polit-
ical parties, a bicameral legislature, and the executive veto, should in-
cline state courts to look more closely at the constitutionality of
initiative measures.1 5 9 This contention is particularly forceful now
that the initiative process has become more susceptible to manipula-
tion and domination by powerful interest groups.160 Given the grow-
ing problems with the initiative process, including the difficulty voters
face in making educated decisions, an increased amount of judicial
scrutiny seems logical.
Professor Eule envisions the standard of review as a fluid one,
where the level of scrutiny would vary. 6' Scrutiny should be high
when the initiative effectively stifles minority voices or political ex-
pression, and lower when the group mounting the challenge is "able to
defend their view in the popular arena."' 62
B. The California Supreme Court and Initiative Review
The contrary school of thought on review of initiative measures is
wary of an appointed judiciary imposing its views over the expressed
will of the populace. 63 This view emphasizes respect for the will and
intelligence of the voter.'64 One advocate of this view asserts that
while "people may sometimes approve mischievous or unconstitu-
tional measures, . . . by and large, . . . they are good legislators."'' 6 5
The California Supreme Court has tended to endorse this latter view
157. Id. at 1558-67.
158. Eule, supra note 18, at 1558-67.
159. Id. at 1557-58.
160. See id, at 1558 n.247.
161. Id. at 1572-73.
162. Id. at 1573.
163. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 304.
164. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRcr DEMOCRACY: THE PoLrIcs OF INrriAmvE, REER-
ENDum Am RECALL, 61 (1989) ("'If we accept the premise that people can choose be-
tween good and bad leaders, we must accept the premise that people can choose between
good and bad laws."') (quoting Carol Carlton, spokesperson for The League of Women
Voters).
165. Donald S. Greenberg, The Scope of Initiative and Referendum in California, 54
CAL. L. REv. 1717, 1747-48 (1966).
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of judicial deference towards initiatives. 166 The court has been espe-
cially reluctant to hold initiatives unconstitutional in their entirety. 167
Even Proposition 13, which one commentator described as the victim
of 'drunken drafting' 168 survived constitutional scrutiny. 69 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has generally held to the standard it enunciated
in Brosnahan v. Brown: "We ordinarily should assume that the voters
who approved a constitutional amendment... 'have voted intelli-
gently upon an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of
which was supplied [to] each of them prior to the election and which
they must be assumed to have duly considered."10 The California
Supreme Court will "not consider or weigh the economic or social
wisdom," nor "pass judgment on the propriety or soundness [of an
initiative]."'
71
The increasing problems with the initiative process have, how-
ever, led the court to take a more activist role in the past five years.
The most striking example is Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian,
171
the challenge to Proposition 103 in which the court invalidated a
twenty percent auto insurance rate rollback provision that had im-
mense public support. The court did so on the grounds that insurers
had a constitutional right to a "fair and reasonable" rate of return."7
This decision came at considerable cost and brought public ire down
upon the court.174 But it is only one in a series of recent decisions
which indicates a growing willingness on the part of the court to inval-
idate initiatives regardless of public sentiment. 75 This trend becomes
more clear by examining the two primary grounds the court has used
to review the constitutionality of initiatives in recent cases: the single-
subject rule and the no revision rule.
1. The Single-Subject Rule
Under the California Constitution, an initiative may not embrace
more than one subject. 76 While this provision would appear to pro-
hibit many of the complex initiatives that have been the source of
166. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1284 (Cal. 1978); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1982).
167. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 302.
168. Edward Hamilton, California's Sloppy Ballot Measures, L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1982.
169. Amador, 583 P.2d 1281.
170. 651 P.2d 274, 283-84 (citations omitted).
171. Amador, 583 P.2d at 1283; Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 281.
172. 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
173. Id at 1257.
174. See Schreiner, supra note 8, at A10 ("Voters also are upset with the initiative pro-
cess because they have found that courts often circumvent their intentions, as the State
Supreme Court did with Proposition 103.").
175. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 303.
176. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
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voter confusion from reaching the ballot or becoming law,177 since
1948, when the single-subject rule was added to the California Consti-
tution, only two initiatives passed by the voters have failed the single-
subject test. 78 The courts have routinely upheld far-reaching initia-
tives on the grounds that a "reasonable relationship" existed among
its provisions.179 Three complex regulatory initiative measures, the
Big Green initiative, the 1982 Victims' Bill of Rights, and the 1974
Political Reform Act, each containing a number of different issues,
survived challenges based on the single-subject rule.8 0 Most recently,
Governor Wilson's Proposition 165 survived a single-subject challenge
even though it would have made wide-ranging changes to welfare pro-
grams, restricted eligibility for other entitlement programs, and given
the governor huge emergency budgetary power. 8' In 1991, however,
in Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Deukmejian,"an
the court invalidated a measure on single-subject grounds for the first
time since 1949. Proposition 105 set forth rules requiring disclosure of
financial information pertaining to contributions in political advertis-
ing, investment in South Africa, and administration of senior citizen
facilities. 83 The court held that the initiative violated the single sub-
ject rule due to the diversity of subjects it covered, even though the
provisions were not particularly complex.'
2. The No-Revision Rule
Article XVIII of the California Constitution states that, while the
California Constitution may be amended by initiative, it may not be
revised unless the legislature places the proposed constitutional revi-
sion on the ballot or calls a constitutional convention.'85 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however, has been very hesitant to invalidate
initiatives on this basis.186 In 1991, Proposition 140, which completely
altered the system of legislative elections by imposing strict term lim-
its on state officials, survived a challenge on the grounds that it consti-
177. See infra text at note 181.
178. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1949); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Deukmejian, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663 (1991).
179. See Perry, 207 P.2d at 47.
180. CALIFOnRIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 315-16.
181. League of Women Voters v. Eu, 7 Cal. App. 4th 649,653-54 (1992); See Arguments
and Text of Proposition 165, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMHLmnr GENERAL ELECtION 46-49,
72-79 (1992).
182. 227 Cal. App. 3d 663 (1991).
183. Text of Proposition 105, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMHLEr. GENERAL ELEcrioN
107, 157-58 (1988).
184. Chemical Specialties, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 670-71.
185. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
186. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMAIGN FiN., supra note 10, at 320-22.
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tuted an improper revision." Prior to 1990, the court had only once
held that an initiative measure improperly revised the constitution.
188
The court partially invalidated an initiative under the no-revision rule
for the second time in 1990 when a portion of Proposition 115, the
"Crime Victims Reform Act," was held to constitute an improper re-
vision. 189 The initiative attempted to force the judiciary to follow fed-
eral law and constrained the state judiciary from following its own
precedents regarding sentencing.190  The court in Raven v.
Deukmejian'9 ' held that this imposition of federal law amounted to animproper revision of the California Constitution and invalidated that
portion of the measure.' 92 The court's recent uses of the single-sub-
ject rule and no-revision rule reflect its heightened awareness of
initiatives.
IV. Judicial Review and Counter-Initiatives
The California Supreme Court has also recently become more ac-
tivist with regard to counter-initiatives. The court's recent willingness
to invalidate measures as constitutionally deficient is a move toward
the heightened scrutiny advocated by Professor Eule. 93 Heightened
scrutiny is appropriate in the area of the counter-initiative because the
motives and methods of their sponsors are often suspect.194 While the
California Supreme Court has become more willing to invalidate ini-
tiatives, however, the court has not become more willing to engage in
close scrutiny of the substantive provisions. Instead, the court has at-
tempted to develop rigid rules that determine when measures will be
invalidated in order to avoid engaging in a "hard look" which would
include examining the purposes of the sponsors. The court's attempt
to avoid close judicial scrutiny of counter-initiatives has exacerbated
the unique problem such initiatives present.
Counter-initiatives create a unique problem because where two
conflicting measures have passed, invalidating one ignores the will of a
majority of the electorate. Yet to meld two initiatives together re-
quires the court to create a hybrid law that was never put before the
voters. Neither of these options is particularly palatable for the judici-
187. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1318 (Cal. 1991).
188. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1949); CAL ORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN.,
supra note 10, at 320.
189. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088-89 (Cal. 1990).
190. Arguments and Text of Proposition 115, CALiFORNIA BALLOT PAMHLE. PRI-
MARY ELECMOrN 33-35, 65-69 (1990).
191. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
192. I at 1089.
193. Eule, supra note 18, at 1507.
194. CALEFORNiA COMM'N ON CAMPAmN FIN., supra note 10, at 181 n.26.
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ary.195 However, given the problems inherent in the growing counter-
initiative strategy and the increasing difficulty voters face in distin-
guishing competing measures, 96 the courts must exercise their power
as the only check upon the process.
A. The Background of Judicial Review of Counter-Initiatives
The California Constitution anticipates the possibility that initia-
tive measures may conflict.197 California Constitution Article H, sec-
tion 10(b), provides: "If provisions of 2 or more measures approved
at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the high-
est affirmative vote shall prevail.' 98 Fifteen other states have statutes
or state constitutions which provide for the possibility of conflicting
ballot initiatives. 99 While five states have statutory or constitutional
language similar to that of the California Constitution section 10(b),
voiding provisions which conflict with provisions of other measures
adopted by a higher affirmative vote, eight states mandate that if two
measures on the same subject pass, the measure receiving the highest
number of votes prevails in its entirety.200
Because the proliferation of counter-initiatives is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon, prior to the passage of Propositions 68 and 73, the
issue of initiative conflict has seldom been litigated.20' The California
courts took up this issue only once prior to 1990 in Gibson v. Bird.3
In Gibson, two virtually identical initiatives regarding inheritance and
gift tax were passed in the 1982 election.2 "3 The only difference be-
tween the two propositions were the provisions pertaining to the ini-
tiatives' operative dates. One measure mandated that the tax repeal
would take effect on the date of passage in 1982, while the other ap-
plied the tax repeal retroactively to 1981.2 The California Court of
Appeal applied the rule of statutory construction that "statutes relat-
ing to the same subject matter must be read together and reconciled
whenever possible."2 '5 The court then held that where the provisions
of two initiatives are in direct conflict, as they were in this case, Cali-
fornia Constitution section 10(b) applies, and the conflicting provision
195. Id at 308-09.
196. See Eule, supra note 18, at 1572 n.310 ("If the electorate was indeed confused
about Proposition 103, it was largely as a result of the insurance industry's own efforts.").
197. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10(b).
198. Id.
199. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAWMAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 309-10.
200. Id.
201. State ex reL Nelson v. Jordan, 450 P.2d 383, 386 (Ariz. 1969).
202. 139 Cal. App. 3d 733 (1983).
203. Id at 734.
204. Id. at 736.
205. Id. (citing Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 547 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1976)).
of the initiative that received fewer votes becomes invalid.206 Hence,
the provision which did not retroactively apply the tax repeal became
law. ' While Gibson interpreted section 10(b) as invalidating only
the conflicting provision and not the entire initiative, the court did not
decide if non-conflicting provisions of two initiative receiving the
fewer votes could be combined together with the provisions of the
initiative receiving the greater number of votes into one law.
Another jurisdiction was forced to address this question. The Ar-
izona Supreme Court held that two initiatives could be combined in
State ex reL Nelson v. Jordan"' because "the will of the majority as
expressed in free elections must prevail."20 9 Nelson was the result of
two initiatives passed by the Arizona electorate, one of which elimi-
nated the office of State Auditor, while the other lengthened the
terms of office for executive offices, including the State Auditor.21 0
Arizona's constitutional provision is similar to California's and states
that: "If two or more conflicting measures or amendments to the Con-
stitution shall be approved by the people at the same election, the
measure... receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes shall
prevail in all particulars as to which there is conflict."'21' The Arizona
court determined that the two measures, could be melded together.
"[W]here, as here, separate parts of a constitution are seemingly in
conflict, it is the duty of the court to harmonize both so that the con-
stitution is a consistent workable whole." ' The court did this, how-
ever, by determining that the two initiatives did not in fact conflict,
but rather addressed two separate clauses of the state constitution.1 3
The decision in Nelson was reached on a rehearing, after a new
appointment to the court altered the balance between the majority
and dissent. The original opinion held that the two statutes were in
direct conflict and that no provisions of the measure receiving less
votes should take effect.2 14 Although the court in Nelson II did com-
bine provisions of two initiatives together into a single law, the court
did not have to decide what should happen when the initiative receiv-
ing fewer votes contains additional provisions. Thus, it remained to
be seen what a court would do with two complex initiatives having
multiple conflicts. With the simultaneous passage of Propositions 68
206. Md
207. Gibson, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 736.
208. 450 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1969).
209. Nelson, 450 P.2d at 386.
210. Id. at 385.
211. ARm. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(12) (emphasis added).
212. Nelson, 450 P.2d at 386.
213. Id. at 387 (holding that one clause of the constitution dealt with the State Auditor,
who was an executive officer, while the second dealt with the terms of office for such
officers).
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and 73, the campaign reform initiatives, the California courts had to
squarely address this issue.
In its first foray into the counter-initiative morass created by the
passage of Propositions 68 and 73, the California Supreme Court had
to determine whether the non-conflicting provisions of an initiative
receiving fewer votes could become law. In Taxpayers to Limit Cam-
paign Financing v. Fair Political Practices Commission,15 the court
held that the non-conflicting provisions could not go into effect.216
The court did not simply hold that all the provisions of Proposition 68
were in conflict with the provisions of Proposition 73, but, instead,
noted that where two initiatives conflict, the initiative as a whole that
receives less votes may not take effect.2 17 The court stated:
[U]nless a contrary intent is apparent in the ballot measures,
when two or more measures are competing initiatives, either be-
cause they are offered as "all or nothing" alternatives or be-
cause each creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme related
to the same subject, section 10(b) mandates that only the provi-
sions of the measure receiving the highest number of affirmative
votes be enforced. Neither an administrative nor a regulatory
agency nor the court, may enforce individual provisions of the
measure receiving the lower number of affirmative votes.2 8
One of the more surprising aspects of this decision is that the court
reached this interpretation of California Constitution section 10(b) in-
dependent of the Petitioner Fair Political Practices Commission and
the Respondent initiative committee. The parties to the action agreed
that the provisions of the measure receiving fewer votes could become
law, and they were simply disputing whether various provisions were
in conflict.2?19 The court instead followed the urging of an amicus cu-
riae, the California Teachers Association.2 °0 In Taxpayers, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between respecting
the will of the voters and simplifying the task of judicial review of
counter-initiatives.
B. The Lower Court Opinion in Taxpayers
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision, the appellate
court applied a different standard in reviewing Propositions 68 and 73.
The California Court of Appeal used a "severability analysis" to de-
215. 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
216. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1222.
217. I. at 1233.
218. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
219. Brief of Appellant Fair Political Practices Commission at 6, Taxpayers to Limit
Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990) (No. S-
012016).
220. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CA~'AIoN FIN., supra note 10, at 307.
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termine which provisions of Propositions 68 should take effect. In
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Com-
mission"2 the appellate court held that the provisions of Proposition
68 and Proposition 73 could be combined into one law, provided that
the provisions of Proposition 68, the measure which passed by fewer
votes, met a two-prong test.- 2 First, the provisions could not conflict
with provisions of Proposition 73. Second, the non-conflicting provi-
sions of Proposition 68 must be severable, or capable of standing
alone, from the portions of Proposition 68 which were in conflict with
Proposition 73.23 The appellate court contended that rules of statu-
tory construction required the court to make every effort to harmo-
nize initiatives as it would conflicting statutes, and "thereby avoid, if
at all possible an interpretation which would cause one of the statutes
to be ignored."'' 4 Section 10(b) would only be invoked in situations
where it was impossible to harmonize the provisions of the two
initiatives.
Under the appellate court's two-prong test, even portions of
Proposition 68 not directly in conflict with Proposition 73 must be in-
dependently severable from the conflicting provisions. Therefore, "if
the statute [or provision] is not severable, then the void part taints the
remainder and the whole becomes a nullity."'2 5 When an initiative
contains a severability clause, as did Proposition 68,26 a presumption
of severability is established. 227
Severability of initiative provisions is determined by a three fac-
tor test set forth in Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court-
The first factor is whether the provision is grammatically severable-
that is, "whether the valid and the invalid parts can be separated by
paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words."''229 Second,
the court determines whether the severed provisions can be indepen-
dently applied, "unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague
by their absence nor inextricably connected to them by policy consid-
221. 260 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1989), petition for review granted, 782 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1989),
rev'd, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1991).
222. Taxpayers, 260 Cal Rptr. at 905.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 547 P.2d 449, 453 (Cal. 1976);
Gibson v. Bird, 139 Cal. App. 3d 733, 736 (1983)).
225. In re Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (Cal. 1947); Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior
Ct., 530 P.2d 605, 617-18 (Cal. 1975); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1255-
56 (Cal. 1989) (rule applies to initiatives).
226. Text of Proposition 68, CAtuwoRNIA BALLOT P.A, mni. PnrmARY ELECTION 56
(1988).
227. Santa Barbara, 530 P.2d at 618.
228. Id. at 617-18; see also Taxpayers, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
229. Santa Barbara, 530 P.2d at 617 (internal quotes omitted).
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erations." 0 'Third, the court makes a subjective determination of
whether the remaining provisions "'would have been adopted by the
legislative body had [it] foreseen the partial invalidation of the stat-
ute."'' 31 The third part of the test has been applied liberally. In
Calfarm Insurance Company v. Deukmejian,.'3 the court held that
provisions of an initiative could go into effect because the voters
would likely have favored the initiative even in the absence of the
invalid provision.23
Using the three part test for severability, the court of appeal in
Taxpayers held that four sections of Proposition 68 could go into ef-
fect: the ban on non-election year fundraising, the enhanced criminal
penalties for violations, the limitation on the total amount of contribu-
tions which could be accepted in one election cycle, and the limitation
on the amount an individual could contribute to all candidates. -
The merging of Propositions 68 and 73 resulted in a campaign
finance law that made both Proposition 13 and Proposition 103235 look
well drafted. While it was complicated, it was nonetheless a workable
law that imposed significant limitations on campaign spendingP
6
Ironically, the combination of fiscal year contribution limits from
Proposition 73, with the aggregate per campaign contribution limits of
Proposition 68, resulted in a campaign finance law more restrictive
than either measure alone.237
C. The Federal Court Battle Over Proposition 73
At the same time that Taxpayers was making its way through the
state court system, there was a separate action in federal court chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Proposition 7331 In Service Employ-
ees International Union, AFL-CIO v. Fair Political Practices
Commission, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
California held Proposition 73's fiscal year contribution limit unconsti-
230. People's Advocate v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 332 (1986).
231. Santa Barbara, 530 P.2d at 618 (quoting In re Bell, 122 P.2d 22, 28 (Cal. 1942)).
232. 771 P.2d 1247, 1256-57 (Cal. 1989).
233. See also People's Advocate, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 333.
234. Taxpayers, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 1018.
235. Passed in the 1988 general election, Proposition 103, the insurance rate rollback,
was still being litigated on the fourth anniversary of its passage. See 20th Century Ins. Co.
v. Garamendi, No. BS016789 (Los Angeles Superior Court, filed May 31, 1992).
236. Telephone interview with Fredric Woocher, supra note 129.
237. Brief of Appellant Fair Political Practices Comm'n at 11, Taxpayers to Limit Cam-
paign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990) (No. S-
012016).
238. See Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n,
721 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 3057 (1992).
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tutional2 39 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed this
decision on the grounds that Proposition 73 was unconstitutionally
discriminatory.2 ' The Ninth Circuit noted that fiscal year contribu-
tion limits allowed incumbents to receive the maximum contribution
from the same donors for up to six years, while challengers who de-
cided to run within a year of the election could collect from the same
donors only once.24' While the federal constitutionality of Proposi-
tion 73 was being litigated, the California Supreme Court granted re-
view of the appellate court decision in Taxpayers on the issue of
whether any provisions of Proposition 68 could take effect. 242
D. The California Supreme Court Decision in Taxpayers
The Fair Political Practices Commission ("FPPC") sought review
of the decision in Taxpayers, contending that the appellate court was
in error in its holding that the four parts of Proposition 68 could go
into effect.243 The FPPC argued that all of the provisions of Proposi-
tion 68 either conflicted with Proposition 73 or could not be severed
from the portions which conflicted.'" Since Proposition 68 was a
more restrictive law, the FPPC argued, it was in complete conflict with
the less restrictive scheme of Proposition 73.45 Several amici curiae,
led by the California Teachers Association ("CTA"), 246 independently
239. Id. at 1180.
240. Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Fair Political Practices Commission,
955 F.2d 1312,1316-22 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Kopp v. Service Employees Int'l Union,
112 S. Ct. 3057 (1992).
241. Id. at 1316-18. Ironically, had the two measures ultimately been enforced under
the court of appeal scheme, the off-year ban of Proposition 68 may have saved Proposition
73 because all candidates would be limited to raising monies in the year their name ap-
peared on the ballot.
242. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 782
P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1989) (granting petition for review). The Ninth Circuit decision came
down after the California Supreme Court's Taxpayers decision. In Taxpayers, the court
held that Proposition 68 could not take effect. After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision,
the sponsors of Proposition 68 filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate in the California
Supreme Court requesting the court to make Proposition 68 operable. Petition for Writ of
Mandate and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Gerken v. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, No. S-025815 (Cal. filed March 26, 1992). The decision in Gerken was
pending at the time this Note went to print. At oral argument on November 2, 1993,
however, Justices Mosk, Kennard, and Arabian appeared to be in favor of reviving Propo-
sition 68. See Todd Woody et al., Defense Faces Tough Questioning on 'Fear of Cancer,'
TiH RECORDER, Nov. 3, 1993, at 1.
243. Brief of Appellant Fair Political Practices Commission at 1-2, Taxpayers to Limit
Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990) (No. S-
012016).
244. Id. at 8.
245. Id
246. The other amiei were the California Political Attorneys' Association and the Cali-
fornia Republican Party.
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argued a different point. 7 The CTA advanced a somewhat convo-
luted argument based on the legislative history of California Constitu-
tion section 10(b).2 It argued that section 10(b) mandated an all or
nothing approach to initiatives, and that therefore no provisions of an
initiative receiving fewer votes could take effect.249
1. The Legislative History Approach
The California Supreme Court ultimately adopted the interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) advanced in the CTA amicus briefL50 Section
10(b) reads: "If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the
same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest af-
firmative vote shall prevail." 1 The court acknowledged that one in-
terpretation of the section is to understand "those" as referring to
only the conflicting provisions of each measure, which would leave the
non-conflicting portions intact. The court held that this interpretation
was "not the only reasonable understanding of the section however.
It can also be read to mean that when initiatives with provisions that
are in fundamental conflict receive affirmative votes at the same elec-
tion, only the provisions of the measure receiving the highest affirma-
tive vote are operative." 2 The court found that the wording of
section 10(b) was ambiguous and required the court to analyze the
legislative history and "contemporaneous understanding at the time of
[section 10(b)'s] adoption." 3 The court's legislative history analysis,
on which it based its holding, relied primarily on the arguments ad-
vanced by the CTA. The CTA argued that the legislative history of
section 10(b) supported a treatment of conflicting initiatives on an "all
or nothing" basis5
4
The court relied upon three sources to determine the legislative
intent at the time of the 1911 passage of section 10(b): a book written
by Franklin Hirschborn, a 1911 legislative observer; a similar measure
regarding local initiatives adopted during the same period; and the
1911 ballot pamphlet argument which reads, "[i]f a conflict arise[s]
247. The California Teachers Association was the lead party for a group of legislative
leaders including Speaker Willie Brown and Senate Leader David Roberti, the same legis-
lative leaders who had campaigned against both Propositions 68 and 73 and were simulta-
neously seeking to have Proposition 73 held unconstitutional. See Application for Leave to
File a Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teachers Association,
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220
(Cal. 1990) (No. S-012016).
248. Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teachers Association, supra note 247, at 3-17.
249. Id.
250. See Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1236-37.
251. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b).
252. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1233 (emphasis added).
253. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1234.
254. Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teachers Association, supra note 247, at 2.
between provisions adopted and approved by the electors at the same
election, that receiving the highest vote shall prevail." 5 Although the
court's examination of the legislative history surrounding the adoption
of section 10(b) reveals a degree of ambiguity in the understanding of
various drafters, there are two problems with the court's analysis.
First, the court wrongly determined that section 10(b) was ambig-
uous. Justice Kennard made this point in her dissent. She noted that
the differentiation between the words "measure," referring to the ini-
tiative in its entirety, and "provision," referring to a part of the initia-
tive, is unambiguous.z 6 Where the language is clear, Justice Kennard
maintained, the court should halt its inquiry.1 7 Instead the court de-
termined that there was ambiguity in the language of section 10(b)
which necessitated the examination of legislative history.
Second, while the legislative history may be contradictory, there
is no reason to presume that because local initiatives were treated in
one way, the legislature may not have intended to treat statewide
measures differently. To the contrary, the fact that the provisions
were worded differently suggests an intent to distinguish the treat-
ment of statewide and local initiatives." 8
2. The Court's Concern with Voter Intent
The dispute over the textual interpretation of section 10(b) is set
within the broader context of the court's unwillingness to engage in
close scrutiny of initiatives or to infer voter intent. The court read
section 10(b) as invalidating Proposition 68 because of the "analytical
difficulty and practical impossibility of implementing the presumed,
but in fact unknown, will of the electorate by judicially merging com-
peting initiative regulatory schemes." 9 The court was particularly
troubled by the appellate court's holding, which created a hybrid law
more stringent than either law standing alone.2 60
a. Applying Rules of Construction to Initiatives
The court's refusal to engage in closer scrutiny of the provisions
of Proposition 68 and 73 was based upon its belief that inferring elec-
255. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1233-35; see also, Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teach-
ers Association, supra note 247, at app. B (emphasis added).
256. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1248.
257. Id.
258. Supplemental Brief of Appellee Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending at 7-8,
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220
(Cal. 1990) (No. S-012016).
259. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1232.
260. IM at 1233 ("[S]ection 10(b) does not anticipate that the court will create a hybrid
regulatory scheme in order to carry into effect some of the provisions of the proposition ...
that received fewer votes.").
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toral intent exceeds the scope of the judicial role. The court wrote
that the lower court's application of the rules of construction led the
court to infer a "fictitious electoral intent."26' Because the voters
could not have anticipated that only parts of both measures would
become law, the court reasoned, the combined provisions could not go
into effect.262 The court again accepted the reasoning of the amicus
curiae CTA in this analysis. The CTA argued that standard rules of
statutory construction used by the Court of Appeal, requiring that
statutes be harmonized wherever possible, should not apply to initia-
tives because initiatives do not go through the same legislative com-
promise process of hearings and debates as do statutes and other
legislation. 63 The CTA also pointed out that unlike the initiative pro-
cess, conflicting statutes are not passed simultaneously by the legisla-
ture and hence the same assumptions cannot be extended to the
initiative context. 4
In its analysis though, the California Supreme Court ignored the
severability analysis expressly developed for harmonizing conflicting
initiatives. The rules of construction utilized by the court of appeal
are not uniquely applicable to statutes. Rather, the court of appeal
used the three part severability test which has traditionally been ap-
plied to initiatives: are the provisions mechanically severable, can
they be applied independently, and would the severed portions have
been adopted independently if the voters had foreseen that the other
portions would be invalidated.265 The California Supreme Court
could have reached the same result, giving no effect to any of the pro-
visions in Proposition 68, through a strict application of this time
tested approach. A strong argument existed for finding that none of
the provisions of Proposition 68 were severable from the provisions in
direct conflict with Proposition 73.
The court has been unwilling to find provisions of initiative meas-
ures severable when the "substantial purpose" of the measure cannot
be accomplished in the absence of the invalid portions. 66 For exam-
ple, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,2 67 the court determined
that it was "doubtful" whether the purpose of the statute in question,
261. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1235.
262. Id
263. Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teachers Association, supra note 247, at 25-26;
see also People v. Davenport, 710 P.2d 861, 870 n.6 (Cal. 1985) ("[Tlhere may be some
basis for the argument that some of the principles which guide courts in their efforts to
ascertain the intent of particular statutory provisions enacted through the legislative pro-
cess may not carry the same force and logic when applied to an initiative measure.").
264. Brief Amicus Curiae of California Teachers Association, supra note 247, at 26.
265. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text; see also Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v.
Superior Ct., 530 P.2d 605, 617-18 (Cal. 1975).
266. See Santa Barbara, 530 P.2d at 618-19.
267. 649 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1982).
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an all-out ban on billboards, could be served absent a provision ban-ning billboards containing non-commercial speech that was severed as
unconstitutional.' 6 If the true concern of the court in Taxpayers was
to avoid inferring "fictitious electoral intent," it could have done so
through a strict application of the severability test. Under this test,
the court could have held that the substantial purpose of Proposition
68 could not be effected in the absence of the provisions in direct con-
flict with Proposition 73.
b. Inferring Electoral Intent
The court refused to combine the provisions of Propositions 68
and 73 absent a showing that a majority of the same voters intended
for both initiatives to pass.269 it is impossible, im' practice, to establish
that the same majority of voters who Voted for Proposition 73 also
voted for adoption of Proposition 68. Although the court recognized
that the judiciary indulges in the presumption that voters understand
what they are voting for,270 the court was unwilling to presume that
voters had both recognized that the initiatives conflicted, and ana-
lyzed the provisions to determine which would go into effect.271 The
court held that in order to combine the two initiatives, there must be a
demonstrable showing that the voters predicted the passage of both
measures, anticipated which provisions would conflict, and gave ade-
quate reflection to the resulting law.272 Justice Mosk's concurrence
noted that the two initiatives were clearly presented to the voters in
the ballot pamphlet as alternatives, and "[t]hus election results do not
allow us to presume that the majority wanted both to pass."273
There is no way to determine that the same majorities voted for
adoption of both measures, and it is not 'altogether clear why the court
considered this a necessary prerequisite for combining the initiatives.
Both initiatives were passed by a majority vote, just as if both meas-
ures had been passed by a majority of the legislature. Courts do not
require that legislators fully understand the ramifications of their ac-
tions and hence should not require a more rigorous level of under-
standing by voters. In United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz,274 the United States Supreme Court held that the fact that Con-
gress was unaware and possibly misinformed about the statutory
scheme it was enacting was insufficient reason to invalidate it since
268. Id. at 908-09.
269. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799
P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990).
270. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 283-84 (Cal. 1982).
271. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1235.
272. See id. at 1235-36.
273. Id. at 1245 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
274. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
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there may have been a plausible reason for the statute.27 5 Passage of
both Proposition 68 and Proposition 73 indicates that the voters were
anxious for campaign finance reform of some sort. It is certainly
"plausible" that in their eagerness to implement change, voters may
have voted for both initiatives in the hope that if one fails the other
might succeed. Also, a voter may have supported both initiatives in
order to achieve as thorough a reform of the campaign finance system
as possible. The California Supreme Court's insistence upon a rigor-
ous demonstration of voter intent results in a scrutiny of conflicts be-
tween initiatives that is not applied to the substantive content of an
initiative.
The severability test set forth in Santa Barbara School District v.
Superior Court allows a court to determine whether voters would have
wanted a particular provision of an initiative to go into effect even in
the absence of other provisions of the initiative.276 This makes unnec-
essary the type of evidence required in the Taxpayers decision as a
prerequisite to combining the provisions of two initiatives. Under a
Santa Barbara severability analysis, instead of requiring this impossi-
ble demonstration of voter intent, if the court finds that a majority of
the electorate supported both reform measures, both should become
law. The lower court's combination of the provisions of Propositions
68 and 73 resulted in a serious campaign reform law, all provisions of
which had been approved by the electorate.277 Ironically, since the
provision in Proposition 68 granting the publicly financed campaign
matching funds, which are perennially unpopular with voters,278 was
no longer a part of the "hybrid" measure crafted by the lower court,279
the combination law may have been the best of all possible worlds for
the electorate. 80
275. Id. at 179.
276. See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 530 P.2d 605, 618 (Cal. 1975).
277. The court could have found that the provisions of Proposition 68 were not severa-
ble since it was not possible to accomplish the substantial goal of the measure in the ab-
sence of the invalid provisions. See id.
278. Linda Chavez, Is Money What Talks in Campaigns Today?, USA TODAY, June 21,
1993, at 13A. ("As Sen. Bob Dole and others have already pointed out, Americans partici-
pate in a referendum on public financing of elections every April 15, and they are decid-
edly unenthusiastic. Federal law currently allows taxpayers to check off $1 in taxes they
already owe to pay for presidential elections, but only about 15% of taxpayers chooses to
do so.").
279. See Center for Pub. Interest Law v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 210 Cal. App.
3d 1476 (1989).
280. At the time this Note went to print, five years after the popular vote for Proposi-
tions 68 and 73, the ultimate result of the passage of the two initiatives remains unclear.
See Claire Cooper, '88 Reform May Be Revived By High Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3,
1993, at A8. The California Supreme Court has held oral argument, but has not yet issued
a decision on whether Proposition 68 may take effect after the federal courts found that the
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Instead of applying a heightened level of judicial scrutiny to
counter-initiatives, the California Supreme Court in Taxpayers estab-
lished a standard of review which allows the court to invalidate initia-
tives with no scrutiny whatsoever. In so doing, the -court failed to
perform its duty of balancing competing interests. By refusing to con-
sider electoral intent, the court ignored the power that certain groups
may wield in the initiative process, and did a disservice to voters who
already faced tremendous obstacles in attempting to vote knowledge-
ably on issues. Furthermore, as the following section will illustrate,
the Taxpayers rule, that section 10(b) invalidates an initiative which
conflicts with an initiative receiving more votes, creates a bifurcated
standard of review which has further confused the already compli-
cated counter-initiative morass.
E. Unanticipated Results of the Taxpayers Decision
The California Supreme Court had some legitimate concerns
when it set out the Taxpayers standard of review. The court was un-
comfortable with combining two conflicting regulatory initiatives, be-
cause it believed that inferring electoral intent exceeded the judicial
role3.21 The court was also concerned about unworkable laws result-
ing from an amalgamation of various measures which often may only
be amended by initiative.m- Although almost all initiatives are
drafted with a provision which allows for legislative amendment,2 3
such amendments must often be in "furtherance of the goals" of the
initiative, a standard which is vague at best and is currently being
tested in the courts of appeal.8 Finally, an all-or-nothing approach
to complex measures simplifies the role of the court. The court has
faced an increase in the number and complexity of initiative chal-
lenges commensurate with the growth of the initiative process.2 5 The
approach set forth in Taxpayers, at first glance, seems to allow the
court to simplify the courts role by invalidating all counter-initiatives
which pass by a smaller majority vote.
The result of the court's action in the Taxpayers decision, how-
ever, has added to the incentives to qualify counter-initiatives. 8 6 In
major provisions of Proposition 73 constitutionally deficient. See Gerken v. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, No. S-025815, (Cal., filed March 26, 1992).
281. See Taxpayers 799 P.2d at 1234-35.
282. CAL. CONsST. art. II, § 10(c); see also Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1234-35; CALIFORNIA
COMM'N ON CAmvnAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 94.
283. CALIORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 94.
284. See Opening Brief of Appellant John Garamendi, Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v.
Garamendi, No. B054071, (2d Dist., Div. 3, filed July 1991).
285. See Jonathan L. Kirsch, Initiatives: Cutting Up the Constitution?, CAL. LAw., Nov.
1984, at 35, 75.
286. CALIFORIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 308-09.
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the wake of Taxpayers, an industry group has a chance to completely
eradicate a citizen measure even if the citizen measure is passed by
the electorate. Moreover, initiatives seeking broad-based reforms,
which are often the target of heavy industry opposition, tend to con-
tain complex provisions which ensure that they fall under the Taxpay-
ers definition of regulatory schemes. In the 1990 general election
alone, three citizen measures were balloted against a rival industry-
sponsored counter-initiative. 8 All three citizen initiatives were com-
plex measures which would probably have qualified as regulatory
schemes.2 89 Given the counter-initiative's proven ability to lower the
approval rate of a citizen initiative,2 90 in the future more citizen-spon-
sored measures will probably pass by a slim margin while simpler in-
dustry measures pass ly a wider margin. 291 By holding that the
measure receiving fewer votes may be completely invalidated, the
court has only increased the likelihood that more counter-initiatives
will be balloted and will end up before the courts.
Finally, the Taxpayers court created a bifurcated standard of re-
view for counter-initiatives, further confusing the process of review.
In a footnote the court stated:
We hold only that under section 10(b) an initiative is inoperative
in its entirety if the voters adopt, by a higher vote, an alternative
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the same subject.
Our construction of section 10(b) does not foreclose operation
of an initiative measure that receives an affirmative vote simply
because one or more minor provisions happen to conflict with
those of another initiative principally addressed to the same
general subject.29
The court gave no guidance to the lower courts for determining when
conflict among initiative provisions was minor and when it was signifi-
cant enough to invalidate the measure receiving fewer votes. The
counter-initiative cases decided subsequent to Taxpayers, discussed in
the next section, indicate the confusion created in the lower courts by
the Taxpayers decision.
V. Judicial Review of Counter-Initiatives After Taxpayers
It is currently unclear if all counter-initiatives will be invalidated
under Taxpayers. Questions remain regarding whether any measure
which passes by a smaller margin than a competing measure is invalid,
287. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1236.
288. See CALrFORLP. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 273-74.
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
291. For example, Propositions 4 and 114 were both simple measures which passed by
greater margins than their more complex companion measures, Propositions 8 and 115.
292. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1237 n.12.
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or whether measures are only completely invalid in certain situations.
The court has apparently created a bifurcated system of review where
the measure receiving the lesser number of votes will be invalidated
when the measures are in "fundamental conflict," but the provision-
by-provision analysis will still be applied where "one or more minor
provisions happen to conflict."293 The court now determines when ini-
tiatives are in fundamental conflict and when the conflict is minor,
based on a bifurcated interpretation of section 10(b) which has no
constitutional foundation. An examination of decisions subsequent to
Taxpayers indicates that distinguishing between minor and fundamen-
tal conflict proves difficult.
Later courts have avoided following Taxpayers in two ways. The
first, holding that a conflict between two initiatives is only minor, is
illustrated by a series of retroactive challenges to Proposition 8, the
1982 Victims' Bill of Rights, which made substantial changes to the
criminal justice system with the overall goal of increasing criminal
convictions.294 Proposition 4, which received the greater number of
votes in the same election, simply dealt with the requirements for ob-
taining bail.295 Several litigants have challenged Proposition 8 on the
grounds that Proposition 4 should have invalidated Proposition 8 in its
entirety.296 The state courts of appeal have uniformly rejected this
contention on two grounds. First, the courts have held that the deci-
sion in Taxpayers does not have retroactive effect. 297 Second, and
more importantly, the courts have labelled the conflict between Prop-
osition 8 and Proposition 4 as minor. By finding the conflict minor,
the appellate courts have been able to apply the plain meaning of sec-
tion 10(b). The courts have voided the provisions of Proposition 8
which dealt with bail and conflicted with Proposition 4, but let the rest
of Proposition 8 take effect. The appellate courts have done exactly
what the California Supreme Court avoided in Taxpayers, combining
provisions of two initiatives into one comprehensive regulatory
scheme.
The second way in which courts have avoided Taxpayers is illus-
trated by Yoshisato v. Superior Court.298 Propositions 114 and 115
were passed together in the 1990 Primary Election.299 Proposition 115
293. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799
P.2d 1220, 1237 n.12 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis added).
294. Arguments and Text of Propositions 4 and 8, CALr oRNIA BALLOT PAMPIiLE.
PRwARY ELEcrlo 16-19, 32-35, 54-56 (1982).
295. Id.
296. People v. Cortez, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (1992); People v. Otto, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1642
(1991); People v. Barrow, 233 Cal. App. 3d 721 (1991).
297. Otto, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1654-55.
298. 831 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1992).
299. Id. at 328.
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was another comprehensive criminal justice reform package designed
to speed and streamline criminal convictions.3° Proposition 114,
placed on the ballot by the legislature, dealt only with expanding the
definition of "peace officers" for purposes of death penalty sentenc-
ing.3 1 Proposition 114 received more votes.3 In order to avoid in-
validating the whole of Proposition 115, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that the Taxpayers holding did not apply where the measures
were not "competing" but rather were "complementary. 3 °3 The
court determined that since the initiatives were not presented to the
voters as competing or alternate measures, the initiatives were com-
plementary and supplementary, regardless of the fact that the two
measures made different amendments to the same section of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code?.3 The court refused to accept the argument that
because the voters had been presented with two measures which
clearly sought to amend the same provision of the penal code, the
measures fell within the Taxpayers definition of comprehensive regu-
latory schemes. The court, however, failed to elaborate on what
would meet the definition of a "comprehensive scheme." It simply
held that the provisions contained in Proposition 114 would take ef-
fect, and that the remainder of Proposition 115 would also remain
valid, essentially melding the two initiatives into one law.
The court could have reached the same result with much less con-
fusion by applying a severability analysis to determine that the provi-
sions of Proposition 115 not in direct conflict with Proposition 114
could go into effect.3 " The Yoshisato decision has further confused
counter-initiative review because now it is not only unclear when a
conflict between initiatives is minor as opposed to fundamental, but
also when initiatives are complementary as opposed to contradictory.
The confusion over "minor," as opposed to "fundamental," con-
flicts may yet be resolved. As this Note went to print, Proposition 68
and 73 were once again before the California Supreme Court?06 The
Taxpayers court's decision that only Proposition 73 would have effect
was complicated by the federal district court's decision, later affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit, that major portions of Proposition 73 were un-
300. Arguments and Text of Propositions 115, CALrnoRiA BALLOT PAMPE PRI-
MARY ELECION, 32-35, 65-69 (1990).
301. Arguments and Text of Propositions 114 and 115, CALIFoRNmA BALLOT PAMPHLE.
PRmIARY ELECION, 28-31 (1990).
302. See Yoshisato, 831 P.2d at 328-29.
303. Id. at 333.
304. Id. at 333-34.
305. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
306. Claire Cooper, '88 Reform May Be Revived By High Court, SAcRA mENO BEE,
Nov. 3, 1993, at A8.
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constitutional.3°7 After the Ninth Circuit invalidated most of Proposi-
tion 73, the California Supreme Court accepted a Petition for Writ of
Mandate to resolve, once again, whether or not Proposition 68 should
go into effect. 308 Justice Mosk foresaw this problem in his concur-
rence in Taxpayers, stating: "A dead horse cannot win a race. If one
proposition is ultimately declared invalid, the other necessarily
prevails by default. '30 9 At oral argument in November of 1993, three
Justices, one short of a majority, appeared to accept this view, and
seemed willing to reinstate Proposition 68.310 Unfortunately, it is not
yet clear exactly how the court would go about making the initiative
operable.
The federal court decision invalidated the portions of Proposition
73 pertaining to contribution limits.31" ' The decision, however, argua-
bly did not invalidate the provisions of Proposition 73 that prohibited
public financing of campaigns nor the miscellaneous provisions
prohibiting mass mailings at public expense.31 2 If the court chooses to
bring back Proposition 68, it must first determine what should happen
to the remaining pieces of Proposition 73. The constitutionally valid
portions of Proposition 73, taken as a whole, do not rise to the level of
a comprehensive regulatory scheme, yet they are not complimentary
to Proposition 68 either. Proposition 73's prohibition on public fi-
nancing is still in direct conflict with Proposition 68's provisions for
making public financing available to candidates. Since Propositions
68 and 73 were presented to the voters as competing measures, if the
court is true to its decision in Taxpayers, Proposition 73 should still
control, even in its emasculated form. Judging from the discussion at
oral argument, however, the court seems uncomfortable with letting
Proposition 68, an initiative passed by a majority of voters, languish
307. Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 721
F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 3057
(1992).
308. As this Note went to print, the California Supreme Court had not yet issued an
opinion on the validity of Proposition 68. At oral argument on November 2, 1993, how-
ever, Justices Mosk, Kennard, and Arabian appeared to be in favor of reviving Proposition
68. See Todd Woody et al., Defense Faces Tough Questioning on 'Fear of Cancer,' THm
REcoRDER, Nov. 3,1993, at 1; see also Petition for Writ of Mandate and Supporting Mem-
orandum of Points and Authorities, Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, No. S-
025815 (Cal. filed March 26, 1992).
309. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1246 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
310. Todd Woody et al., Defense Faces Tough Questioning on 'Fear of Cancer,' Tim
RECORDER, Nov. 3, 1993, at 1
311. Service Employees, 955 F.2d at 1349.
312. See Petition for Writ of Mandate and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities at 25, Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, No. S-025815 (Cal. filed March
26, 1993).
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while the fragments of Proposition 73 remain.3 13 The continuing cam-
paign reform morass illustrates the problems with the standard
adopted by the court in Taxpayers. The more useful analysis, and the
one championed by the petitioners is the severability, analysis.
314 If
the court were to apply the severability analysis to this situation, it
could determine that the voters would not have intended Proposition
73 to go into effect in the absence of the invalidated provisions limit-
ing campaign contributions and the court could then allow Proposition
68 to become fully operative.
VI. Countering the Counter-Initiative: A Proposal for
Reform
Because of the impact which counter-initiatives have upon the
already problem-wrought initiative process, the courts should estab-
lish clear standards for counter-initiatives. The largest failure of the
Taxpayers decision is its lack of clear guidance to the lower courts.
The confusion over whether initiatives are in minor conflict or are
competing regulatory measures, combined with the distinction drawn
in Yoshisato between complementary and competing initiatives, has
precluded any clear standard of review for counter-initiatives. The
California Supreme Court's approach in the Taxpayers decision, sim-
plifying judicial review of counter-initiatives by invalidating the mea-
sure receiving the smaller number of votes, is the wrong approach for
the courts to take to the counter-initiative problem. The judiciary is
responsible to the people of California to maintain the initiative pro-
cess as a workable tool of government. By engaging in a higher de-
gree of scrutiny, and using the already developed severability analysis,
the California Supreme Court could have established a much more
helpful and responsible standard of review for counter-initiative
measures.
A. A Proposal for Judicial Reform
Several commentators have advanced the idea that the California
courts need to apply a higher level of scrutiny to initiative meas-
ures.315 The need for a higher level of judicial scrutiny is particularly
apparent in the counter-initiative context. However, it is not immedi-
ately clear what this higher level of scrutiny should be based upon.
Professor Eule argues for a "hard judicial look" at initiative measures
313. Claire Cooper, '88 Reform May Be Revived By High Court, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 3, 1993, at As.
314. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties at 13-23, Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, No. S-025815, (Cal. filed March 26,
1992).
315. See generally Lee, supra note 43, at 3; Eule, supra note 18.
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because the initiative process shuts out minority voices and contains
none of the protections for minorities that have been built into the
legislative process.316 He points to initiative measures declaring Eng-
lish the official language, banning public funding of abortions, author-
izing involuntary HIV testing for sex crime suspects, and repealing
anti-discrimination laws against homosexuals as examples of how mi-
norities are often disadvantaged in the initiative process.317 Professor
Eule's formulation of a hard judicial look is premised largely on con-
cern for individual rights and equal application of the laws, neither of
which is necessarily implicated in the counter-initiative context. 18
Professor Eule acknowledges that he is unsure how judicial scrutiny
should be increased where an initiative measure does not clearly have
a disproportionate impact upon a discrete group.
3 19
Professor Eule makes an important point in analyzing the 1988
insurance counter-initiatives. "To suggest that the voters approved,
let alone understood, the many facets of Proposition 103 is pure my-
thology." 3' The vote on the counter-initiatives was more a visceral
reaction against the insurance industry and towards the consumer
movement represented by Ralph Nader than a considered enactment
of legislation. 2 ' The courts must be attuned to these visceral actions
of the electorate and do their best to effectuate them. Because it is so
difficult for voters to sort out the provisions of counter-initiatives,
much less to determine the motivations of their sponsors, the courts
must accept a larger share of this burden.
Factors that the court needs to consider in reviewing counter-ini-
tiatives include: whether the financial resources of sponsors of com-
peting initiatives are imbalanced, whether the intent of a counter-
initiative's sponsorship is really to enact legislation or simply to defeat
or compromise another initiative,3zz and whether the sponsors of a
counter-initiative presented the measure to the electorate in a decep-
tive or confusing form. These factors should be taken into account by
courts whenever they are confronted with a situation where two initia-
tives with conflicting provisions receive electoral majorities. Where
an industry counter-initiative secures the lower margin of votes, these
factors may cause the court to conclude that no provisions of the
316. See Eule, supra note 18, at 1555.
317. Id at 1551.
318. i at 1559.
319. See &L at 1568-73.
320. Id at 1571.
321. Id. at 1570.
322. In Marblehead v. San Clemente, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1504 (1991), the court invali-
dated an initiative on the ground that it was a resolution calling for a general plan amend-
ment, rather than an enactment of legislation. An expansive reading of this case could
support a holding that counter-initiatives drafted solely to undermine another initiative
also do not enact legislation. Id.
Fall 19931
184 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:143
counter-measure may take effect. The severability analysis would be
particularly helpful here. If in fact a counter-initiative was qualified
largely to undermine another initiative, it should be harder for any
portion of the initiative to stand independent of the invalid portions.
Where a counter-initiative which has some of the features dis-
cussed above secures the greater number of votes, the court should be
more willing to combine provisions of the measure receiving the lower
amount of votes. In this way the court would give full effect to the
intent of the voters communicated by their approval of two conflicting
initiatives. For example, in the Proposition 68 and 73 context, the vot-
ers clearly wanted reform of the campaign finance laws. Combining
the provisions of the two initiative measures was the best way to effec-
tuate this goal. On the other hand, if one of the auto insurance indus-
try-sponsored initiatives had passed along with Proposition 103, the
intent of the electorate to reduce auto insurance premiums would not
have been clear, nor appropriately effectuated by combining the pro-
visions of the two initiatives.
The California Supreme Court wrote in Taxpayers that the initia-
tive process would be better served by "presentation at a subsequent
election of a new initiative measure which the voters can consider in
light of the scheme established by the measure that prevailed in the
earlier election," rather than by combining the provisions of two ini-
tiatives.3 1 But the court fails to recognize the tremendous pressures
which voters face in attempting to enact reform initiatives. The Cali-
fornia judiciary needs to recognize the threat posed to the integrity of
the initiative process by the counter-initiative and be more willing to
take a close look at these measures.
B. A Proposal for Legislative Change
The counter-initiative morass could better and more simply be
resolved by legislative action. An amendment to the California Elec-
tions Code providing for the redesign of the ballot and the ballot pam-
phlet could restore voters' ability to comprehend and choose between
competing measures.3 24 First, grouping counter-initiatives together on
the ballot and summarizing how they conflict would better alert voters
to problem initiatives.3 5 Second, voters should be made to choose
between counter-initiatives on the ballot. Three states already make
voters choose between conflicting measures, but they do so by differ-
ent procedures
26
323. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1235-36.
324. CALIFOrNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 252-53.
325. Id. at 253.
326. Id. at 253-54.
In Washington, voters are first presented with a choice between
voting "for either measure" and "for neither measure. ' 327 The voters
may then take the additional step of voting for the measure they pre-
fer.3 2 The problem with this two-step process is that it causes consid-
erable confusion among voters.32 9 Also, since many of the voters who
choose the option of "neither measure" do not go to cast an affirma-
tive vote, an initiative can be enacted into law by a very small plurality
of the voters.330
Maine presents voters with three options.33' Voters are in-
structed to vote for measure A, measure B or neither measure.3 2
Voters are advised that if they vote for more than one measure their
vote will not be counted.333 This system suffers from the same defi-
ciency as the Washington system, although to a lesser degree. Initia-
tive measures can be enacted by a small plurality of voters if the vote
is split closely between the three options.3 4 Washington and Maine
also only require the voter to choose between counter-initiatives when
one measure is citizen-sponsored and the other is placed on the ballot
by the state legislature.
Massachusetts deals with the problem of counter-initiatives by
placing a notice at the top of the section indicating that only one mea-
sure can take effect. As in Maine, voters are presented with three
choices, measure A, measure B and neither measure, but unlike
Maine, voters are free to vote for both measures A and B if they sup-
port both.33 5 This system addresses the California Supreme Court's
concern in the Taxpayers decision, that the same majority may not
have voted for both propositions, by clarifying what proportion of the
electorate supported each measure.3 6 The Massachusetts system ap-
plies to both citizen-versus-citizen counter-initiatives and citizen-ver-
sus-legislative initiatives.337 The primary advantage of this system is
that it puts the voter on notice that only one of two measures can
become law.338 The Massachusetts system ensures that a majority of
voters supported an initiative while still having voters choose between
327. Id. at 253.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAPATGN FiN., supra note 10, at 253. An initiative
could pass simply by receiving 51% of the votes cast by those voters who chose "either




334. IM. at 254.
335. Id.
336. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
337. CALIFONIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 253, n. 84.
338. Id. at 311.
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conflicting measures. This simple restructuring of the ballot in Cali-
fornia would eliminate the need for much of the judicial intervention
that currently pervades the initiative process.
Of course, there would be additional consequences of presenting
conflicting initiatives to voters as a choice. It would increase the bur-
den on the courts to determine in pre-election review if initiatives ac-
tually conflicted to the extent that they should be presented as
mutually exclusive. California already provides, however, for rapid
review of the Voter's Pamphlet by any voter who charges that the
pamphlet contains false or misleading information.339 Pre-election
challenges to the ballot pamphlet are already quite common, and
courts have proven willing both to hear petitions and to order changes
to the ballot pamphlet prior to an election. 34° While there would
probably be a pre-election challenge to each counter-initiative that the
Secretary of State determined should be presented to voters as a
choice, the burden of reviewing the measures for conflict at the pre-
electoral stage may actually relieve the judiciary of the more onerous
task of post-election initiative review.
An additional change that would help voters is disclosure of the
major sources of financing of counter-initiatives, as well as the
amounts of the contributions. The now defunct Proposition 105 re-
quired this type of disclosure in political advertising.34' Including such
disclosures in the ballot pamphlet could be very informative to voters.
The problem with requiring disclosure of funding in the ballot pam-
phlet, however, is the time constraints in the ballot pamphlet process.
A great deal of opposition money pours in during the final weeks of a
campaign.342 Requiring disclosure of funding may give groups added
incentive to defer contributing until after the ballot pamphlet has
been printed. Nonetheless, some disclosure of the financial resources
behind counter-initiatives would be helpful to voters in deciding be-
tween conflicting measures.
Simple and straightforward though these changes may be, they
require legislative action. Although there have been periodic
grumblings and some moves toward reform of the initiative process,'
very few of the logical procedural reforms have been passed.3 "
339. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 88006 (West 1993); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3576 (West 1977).
340. CALnORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 242.
341. See Chemical Specialties Mfrs Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663 (1991).
342. Telephone interview with Duane Peterson, supra note 76.
343. See Package of Bills Introduced to Reform Initiative Process, S.F. CHRON. Mar. 5,
1991, at A2.
344. See Ray Sotero, Lawmakers' Battle Against Ballot Initiative Fizzles, GAN, Tr
NEws SERvIcE, June 21, 1991; Ray Sotero, Grassroots Democracy Survives Legislative
Backlash, GAmNET NEWS SERvicE, Sept. 26, 1991.
In the absence of legislative reform, the counter-initiative quag-
mire could be alleviated by clarifying section 10(b). However, since
section 10(b) is a constitutional provision, an alteration to clarify
whether it invalidates an entire measure receiving fewer votes would
require a two-thirds vote of the legislature.345 Despite considerable
unhappiness with the initiative process within the legislature, this issue
neither carries enough passion nor is the subject of a clear enough
consensus to enable a constitutional amendment to be passed.
The only other way to alter section 10(b) is, of course, by initia-
tive. The same lack of consensus over and lack of commitment to the
issue prevent the legislature from placing this issue on the ballot. Fur-
thermore, the burden of qualifying a constitutional amendment by sig-
nature-gathering is considerable. Again, no single group is affected by
this problem enough to warrant the commitment of sufficient financial
resources to deal with the issue.
Conclusion
To realize how incredibly complicated initiative measures have
become, one has only to attempt to sort out the provisions of Proposi-
tions 68 and 73. Voters are faced with multiple issues of this complex-
ity on almost every ballot. The million-dollar campaigns waged
around many initiative issues, with one side tending to exaggerate the
effects while the other side tries to over-simplify the issues, make it all
the more difficult to sort out what the impact of an initiative will be.
346
Making informed decisions on the issues has become a Herculean
task. Each time a particularly dense ballot comes around, talk of re-
forms begins again. Voters, however, remain very protective of their
initiative power; they are hesitant to have it tampered with and are
cautious of reforms.347 The initiative system and its accompanying
problems are going to be a continuing presence in California politics.
The judiciary is currently the only institutional check on the initi-
ative process. In the absence of legislative reform, the judiciary needs
to acknowledge that various factors have made it more difficult for
voters to make informed decisions, and that initiative votes cannot
always be taken at face value. The increase in initiative complexity
needs to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in judicial activ-
ism. Despite an understandable reluctance to tamper with the express
will of the electorate, the California Supreme Court needs to ac-
knowledge the difficulty that voters face in making a decision and
must be more willing to closely scrutinize initiative measures. Finally,
345. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
346. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 10, at 180-81.
347. Sotero, Lawmakers' Batle, supra note 344; Sotero, Grassroots Democracy, supra
note 344.
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procedural reforms could alleviate some of the need for enhanced ju-
dicial scrutiny. In the meantime, the current absence of checks on the
process is increasing the already rampant voter frustration with
government.
